The AUKUS Parties—Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—have announced Australia’s purchase of nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines.
The announcement states that the AUKUS Parties have decided on three phases for the project’s implementation over the next three decades, including training and capacity building, the purchase of fully operational, conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, and the purchase of fully functional, welded power units for subs to be built in Australia.
The safeguards obligations of the AUKUS Parties must be carried out in line with their individual safeguards agreements and additional procedures with the Agency. Australia signed a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the Agency in connection with the NPT and an additional protocol thereto (AP) as a nonnuclear-weapon state (NNWS) signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
The Agency is authorized and required by the CSA to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities conducted on Australian soil under its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere. As long as Australia establishes an agreement with the Agency in this regard, Article 14 of Australia’s CSA permits Australia to utilize nuclear material that must be safeguarded under the CSA in a nuclear activity, such as nuclear propulsion for submarines.
Both the United States and the United Kingdom are nuclear-weapons states that are members of the NPT and have signed a voluntary offer safeguards agreement (VOA) and an AP with the Agency. International transfers of nuclear material to NNWSs must be reported to the Agency under their VOA, and exports of equipment that is defined in the AP must be reported under the AP.
Priority is given to the Parties’ legal responsibilities and non-proliferation concerns. The Agency’s primary guiding concept will still be to fulfil its verification and non-proliferation mandate. It will be used in a fair, practical, and impartial manner.
Foreign Minister Wong has formally asked the Agency to start talks on an agreement needed by Article 14 of Australia’s CSA in a letter addressed to me. Australia has further sent the Agency preliminary design data for this project in compliance with the relevant regulations (modified Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangements).
Serious legal and intricate technical issues are involved in this procedure. The essential safeguards method must be developed in exact accordance with the preexisting legal framework, as mandated by Article 14 of the CSA. Importantly, the agreement will be sent to the IAEA Board of Governors for approval once it has been finalized.
The AUKUS Parties reiterated in their messages their earlier declaration that upholding Agency safeguards and the integrity of the nuclear non-proliferation framework remain the main goals of AUKUS. Additionally, they vowed to uphold the effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation framework and to fulfil their commitments under the non-proliferation and safeguards provisions of their individual agreements with the Agency.
I further take note of Australia’s earlier assurance to the Agency that it has no plans to pursue uranium enrichment or reprocessing in connection with AUKUS and that it will not manufacture nuclear fuel as part of this effort.
The Agency’s participation in this process is anticipated under the current legal system and fully within its statutory purview. The Agency will handle this problem in a professional, unbiased, and independent manner.
The Agency’s statutory mission, the safeguards agreements, and any additional protocols established by the AUKUS Parties shall serve as the only sources of guidance for the open process I will ensure. To enable the Agency to achieve its technical safeguards objectives for Australia under the CSA and AP, an effective arrangement under Article 14 of Australia’s CSA will be required. In the end, the Agency must be sure that this initiative won’t pose any concerns for proliferation.
Following Australia’s declaration of its desire to begin negotiations with the Agency on an Article 14 arrangement, I will keep the Board of Governors and Member States of the IAEA informed of our future activities as the conversations with the AUKUS Parties proceed. As part of this procedure, I will also present a report on this subject to the Board of Governors’ upcoming regular session, which will be held in Vienna in June 2023.
